Abstract. It is known that skeptical abductive explanations with respect to classical logic can be characterized semantically in a natural way as formulas with second-order quantifiers. Computing explanations is then just elimination of the second-order quantifiers. By using application patterns and generalizations of second-order quantification, like literal projection, the globally weakest sufficient condition and circumscription, we transfer these principles in a unifying framework to abduction with three non-classical semantics of logic programming: stable model, partial stable model and well-founded semantics. New insights are revealed about abduction with the partial stable model semantics.
Introduction
An abductive explanation is basically a formula X such that for given formulas F , the "background knowledge base", and G, the "observation", it holds that F and X together entail G and, in addition, X satisfies application specific further properties, for example, that it only contains symbols from a given vocabulary and that it is as weak as possible. For classical logic, the semantics of an abductive explanation in this sense can be characterized by a second-order formula as follows:
An explanation X can then be computed by performing second-order quantifier elimination on the second-order formula, that is, computing a formula which is equivalent to the given second-order formula but does not involve second-order quantifiers. If explanations are constrained to be minimal conjunctions of literals, this scheme also applies, but indirectly: the actual explanations are then obtained as the prime implicants of X. Variants of this understanding of abductive explanations are present in a number of works, e.g., [15, p312ff.] , [24, 7] , but the relationship to second-order quantifier elimination seems to have been made explicit first in [5] . Abduction plays several important roles in logic programming, an area where it has been investigated extensively between the late 80s and the early 2000s [19, 3] . Many of these approaches are oriented at deriving methods for computing explanations from methods for evaluating logic programs. Semantic characterizations, e.g., [20, 8, 25, 1] , are usually placed aside of methods, related to them by correctness properties and complexity results.
In contrast, the objective of the present work is to combine the second-order elimination approach with non-monotonic semantics of logic programming, resulting in a characterization of abductive explanations for logic programming semantics that is "constructive" in the sense that it maps the computation of explanations to problems of second-order quantifier elimination. As logic programming semantics we consider the popular stable model semantics and two related three-valued semantics, the well-founded and the partial stable model semantics 1 . We work with representations of these logic programming semantics in classical logic extended by second-order operators, based on known translations [23, Section 3.4 .1] [18] . Under this view, the stable model semantics appears as circumscription that is applied only to certain occurrences of predicates -those that are not subjected to negation as failure. Accordingly, a logic program can be represented by a classical formula where these occurrences are distinguished by special predicate names. A logic programming semantics then corresponds to a logical operator sem that is wrapped around a classical representation F of a program, such that sem(F ) expands into a formula of classical logic extended by second-order operators. The discrimination between different logic programming semantics is expressed by different such wrapping operators, allowing to embed programs considered under different semantics within a single classical formula. With respect to abduction, only a single entailment relation -classical entailment -is required, in contrast to other generic formalizations such as [8] , where the discrimination is done "globally" by specific inference operators.
The link between the inherently classical second-order characterization of abductive explanations displayed above as (i) and the non-classical logic programming semantics will be provided by a lemma that states requirements under which the operators sem expressing non-monotonic context are "transparent" for explanations E, that is, it holds that sem(F )∧E ≡ sem(F ∧E). In the case of the investigated three-valued semantics, two related versions E, E of the explanation are required, such that the established relationship is sem(F )∧E ≡ sem(F ∧E ). To determine explanations with respect to a logic program, the abducibles, that is, the atoms that are allowed in explanations should not be submitted to the closed-world assumption, since, unless they occur in rule heads, they would then be just set to false by the non-monotonic semantics. We take this into account by using generalizations of the considered logic programming semantics that allow to specify a set of ground atoms as open, that is, not subjected to the closed-world assumption. These generalizations are quite straightforward: In the underlying representations of these semantics by circumscription, the open atoms just correspond to fixed -in contrast to minimized -predicate instances.
The entailment based notion of abductive explanation sketched at the beginning is called skeptical or cautious. In contrast, credulous or brave explanations, are constrained by the requirement that the background knowledge base combined with the explanation is consistent with observation. For the well-founded semantics every normal logic program has exactly a single model and thus both 1 In the sense of [28, 18] , in contrast to contemporary work by Saccà and Zaniolo where partial stable model has been used for a related semantics. See [30, Introduction] .
notions coincide. In this paper, we focus on the skeptical view for the other semantics. We consider finite normal ground programs, but the material should generalize to programs with disjunctive heads, negation as failure in the head, and first-order quantification, as indicated in [35, 37] .
As basic second-order operator we use literal projection [33] , a generalization of predicate quantification. Its arguments make those symbols explicit that are "not quantified" and it allows, so-to-speak, to quantify just upon predicate occurrences with a specific polarity. The latter feature is used to model the considered three-valued logic programming semantics. The application pattern of second-order quantification in (i) is called globally weakest sufficient condition (GWSC) and specified in terms of projection. It is closely related to weakest sufficient condition [24, 5] . Predicate quantification can be applied to express predicate circumscription [4] . We express circumscription by a dedicated second-order operator with a syntax analogous to projection [37] . We will develop the "constructive" characterizations of abductive explanations for the three considered logic programming semantics in parallel. This framework leads to clear formal conceptualizations of various subtle issues in abduction, such as notions of minimality and handling of negative facts in explanations. For abduction with the partial stable model semantics, the author is not aware of another thorough formal treatment. A distinguishing feature of that semantics is that it can be applied to deliver meaningful explanations for facts being observed as undefined.
This paper is an extended version of [38] . The rest of the main part is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 the background framework of classical propositional logic extended by certain second-order operators is specified. This is applied in Sect. 3 to characterize the considered logic programming semantics. In Sect. 4 definitions of abductive explanation and related concepts are given and in Sect. 5 the central concept of globally weakest sufficient condition is summarized. On this basis, the main results of the paper are developed in Sect. 6: Characterizations of abductive explanations and related concepts with respect to logic programming semantics as formulas with second-order operators. Related works are reviewed in Sect. 7 and possible ways to realize the approach in practice are sketched in the conclusion, Sect. 8. Proofs of the results in the main part of the paper and further investigations are provided in appendix sections.
Notation and Semantic Framework
Formulas, Literals, Scopes and Predicate Groups. We consider formulas of classical propositional logic, extended by operators for projection and circumscription. They are constructed from propositional atoms, truth value constants , ⊥, the unary connective ¬, binary connectives ∧, ∨, →, ←, ↔, as usual, and the two operators project and circ to express projection and circumscription. As meta-level notation we use n-ary versions of ∧ and ∨. Based on the premise that the material developed here does in principle generalize to a first-order setting, we speak of propositional atoms, or synonymously Boolean variables, also as 0-ary predicates. A literal is a pair of an atom and a sign, where we write the positive (negative) literal with atom A as +A (−A). The complement of a literal L is denoted by L. If S is a set of literals, then S denotes the set of the complements of the members of S. We call a formula that is an atom or a negated atom a literal formula, or, if no ambiguity arises, also briefly a literal. A scope is a set of literals. We assume a fixed propositional signature whose set of atoms is denoted by ATOMS. The sets of all literals, all positive literals, and all negative literals w.r.t. ATOMS are denoted by ALL, POS, NEG, respectively. An atom scope S is a scope such that S = S. Since a literal is a member of an atom scope if and only if its complement is a member, as a shorthand, we represent an atom scope also just by the set of atoms of its members. To express logic programs and three-valued formulas by classical formulas we use a signature where each "original" predicate is available in different "copies", indicating whether an occurrence is subject to negation as failure or how it contributes to the three-valued reading. These "copies" are gathered into socalled predicate groups: In addition to the set of propositional atoms ATOMS, we assume a set of source atoms that play the role of atoms in other logics that we will represent in our classical framework. Each source atom A is associated with a number of corresponding atoms A 0 , . . . , A n ∈ ATOMS, where the superscripts indicate their predicate group. More precisely: We assume that ATOMS can be arranged as {A Classical Semantics, Projection and Circumscription. An interpretation is a set of literals that contains for all atoms A ∈ ATOMS exactly one of +A or −A. The satisfaction relation |= between interpretations and formulas is defined with a clause for atoms and for each logical operator. For instance, for all interpretations I, scopes S, atoms A, and formulas F, G it holds that: I |= A iff +A ∈ I; I |= ¬F iff I |= F ; I |= F ∧ G iff I |= F and I |= G; I |= project S (F ) iff there is an interpretation J s.t. J |= F and J ∩ S ⊆ I; I |= circ S (F ) iff I |= F and there is no interpretation J s.t. J |= F and J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S. Entailment and equivalence are then defined as usual: F |= G iff for all interpretations I it holds that if I |= F then I |= G; F ≡ G iff F |= G and G |= F . The formula project S (F ) whose semantics has just been defined with the |= relationship is called the literal projection, or briefly projection, of formula F onto scope S. The forgetting in F about S is a notational variant where the scope is considered complementary [33, 21] :
(ii)
Combined with first-order logic, projection generalizes second-order quantification, with respect to propositional logic quantified Boolean formulas (QBFs): A QBF ∃p F can be expressed as forget {+p,−p} (F ) or as project ALL−{+p,−p} (F ). If S is an atom scope, the semantic definition of projection is equivalent to: I |= project S (F ) iff there is an interpretation J s.t. J |= F and J ∩ S = I ∩ S. Literal projection also allows to express, so-to-speak, quantification upon just the positive or negative occurrences of a Boolean variable in a formula. Intuitively, the projection of a formula F onto scope S is a formula that expresses about members of S the same as F , but expresses nothing about other literals. A projection of a propositional formula is equivalent to a formula in negation normal form in which only literals in the projection scope do occur. The latter formula is a uniform interpolant of the original formula with respect to the scope. A naive way to construct such a uniform interpolant -or to eliminate the projection operator -is indicated by the following equivalences, where
) denotes formula F with all occurrences of atom p replaced by (⊥):
. For formulas F and scopes S we define
We use the symbol also when introducing variables, e.g., "let F S be a formula" for "let F be a formula such that F S". Projection provides a semantic account for systematically replacing atoms from a given predicate group to their correspondents from another one. Let i, j be different predicate groups. We define
If F is a propositional formula, then rename i\j (F ) is equivalent to F with all occurrences of atoms from group i replaced by their correspondents from j. We define rename [i1\j1, ..., in\jn] (F ) as shorthand for rename in\jn (...(rename i1\j1 (F ))...).
The circ operator has the same argument types as project and has also been semantically defined above. It allows to express variants of parallel predicate circumscription where the effects on each atom are controlled by a scope argument [37] . Atoms that occur just in a positive literal in the scope are minimized, atoms that occur just in a negative literal are maximized, atoms that occur in both polarities are fixed and atoms that do not at all occur in the scope are varying. Thus, if F is a formula whose atoms are in disjoint sets P , Q and Z, then the parallel predicate circumscription of P in F with fixed Q and varied Z, traditionally written as CIRC[F ; P ; Z], can be expressed as circ (P ∩POS)∪Q (F ).
Classically Represented Logic Programming Semantics
We consider finite normal logic programs that are ground, that is, finite sets of rules of the form p q 1 , . . . , q m , not r 1 , . . . , not r n ,
where m, n ≥ 0 and p, q i , r i are source atoms. The classical representation of a normal logic program is a classical propositional sentence, obtained from the program by forming the conjunction of its members and replacing each source atom by its representative from the indicated group as well as replacing the connectives with classical ones, according to the following schema:
Information that was expressed in (v) by the positioning of an atom in a rule head versus the negative body is now captured instead by the predicate group. 
The circumscription scope in this definition specifies that all atoms from group 1 as well as all open atoms are fixed, while the remaining atoms from group 0 are minimized. This characterization of stable models in terms of circumscription originates from [23, Section 3.4.1] (see also [22, 35] 
Partial Stable Model Semantics. Partial stable model and well-founded semantics associate three-valued models with a logic program. Predicate groups can be applied to express the three truth values F, U, T in terms of two truth values: An interpretation I over at least all atoms of groups 0 and 1 is said to assign to a source atom p the three-valued truth value
. The remaining possibility I |= (p 0 ∧ ¬p 1 ) does not correspond to a three-valued truth value and models with this combination can be excluded with the axiom
assuming ATOMS is finite. The logical operator pstable defined below renders the partial stable model semantics [29] by combining the translation of [18] into programs with stable models semantics with the translation of the stable model semantics shown above. Each of the two translations involves discrimination between two predicate groups, yielding four groups 0, 1, 2, 3 in combination, which are reduced in the final value of pstable by renaming to groups 0 and 1. The models of pstable O (F ) represent the three-valued partial stable models by combining the values of atoms for predicate groups 0 and 1. In the definition of pstable we write the numbers denoting predicate groups in binary notation to indicate how the two involved translations are combined: The right digit corresponds to the group discrimination required by the translation into stable models, the left digit to the discrimination required by expressing the stable model semantics with circumscription. The arguments of pstable are like those of stable. For ungrouped atom scopes O and formulas F define
where M = ((00∪01)∩POS)∪10∪11∪O. To represent values of pstable, we write a conjunction C of literal formulas that contains for each atom p ∈ ATOMS∩(0∪1) either p or ¬p as conjunct and is consistent with cons as pair T , F of two sets of source atoms, analogous to common notation for three-valued interpretations:
T is the set of all p such that p 0 is a conjunct in C, and F is the set of all p such that ¬p
would be written as {p}, {q} . Compared to the stable model semantics, the partial stable model semantics yields additional models, caused, e.g., by atoms that are "undefined" since they are exempt from the closed world assumption or since they occur "paradoxically" in the head and negated in the body of some rule. (2) , that is, {}, {} , does not correspond to any disjunct in (1) . As an example for a "paradoxical"
Well-Founded Semantics. An interpretation is called informationally less-orequal-than a second one if and only if each atom whose three-valued truth value assigned by the first interpretation is T or F has the same truth value assigned by the second one. Models that are minimal with respect to this relation can be characterized by circumscription upon the scope
If the models of a formula F satisfy cons, then the informationally minimal models of F are the models of circ imin-scope (F ). If cons is used together with circumscription upon imin-scope, it can equivalently be placed inside or outside of the circumscription operator: circ imin-scope (cons ∧ F ) ≡ cons ∧ circ imin-scope (F ). Now, well-founded models are exactly the informationally minimal partial stable models [28] , allowing to characterize the well-founded semantics as
An attractive feature of the well-founded semantics is that each normal logic program has exactly a single model. This property applies also to the generalized variant wf O with specified open atoms. By the following proposition, the consequences G for which it holds that G imin-scope are for the well-founded semantics exactly the same as for the partial stable model semantics:
Proposition 2 (Consequences under Well-Founded and Partial Stable Model Semantics). If O is a set of ungrouped atoms, and F, G are formulas
The precondition G imin-scope of Prop. 2 is met for example by formulas G = p 0 and G = ¬p 1 , which express that the truth value assigned to p is T and F, respectively, since (cons
, which expresses that the value assigned to p is U.
Basic Concepts of Abduction
An abductive setting gathers the parameters of abductive reasoning problems:
Definition 3 (Abductive Setting). An abductive setting is a tuple A = sem, O, S, F, G of (1.) a logical operator sem with two arguments (an ungrouped atom scope and a formula), the programming semantics, (2.) an ungrouped atom scope O, the open scope, (3.) an ungrouped scope S ⊆ O, the explanation scope, (4.) a formula F , the background, and (5.) a formula G, the observation. This is similar to abductive framework [19] , but here also the observation is included. The programming semantics is an operator like stable that specifies the logic programming semantics to be used. The open scope specifies the atoms that are to be considered open with respect to the logic programming semantics. The explanation scope specifies the vocabulary along with associated polarities that is available for explanations. It is equal to or a subset of the open scope, and thus must not necessarily be an atom scope, that is, it can contain literals but not their complements. Background and observation are formulas representing the background theory presentation and the observation, respectively.
Since we will focus on explanations that are conjunctions of literals, we provide convenient notation for these: A conjunctive clause is a consistent conjunction of literal formulas, with the empty conjunction as special case. Let C, D be conjunctive clauses. We write C |= D as D ⊆ C, and (C |= D and C ≡ D) as D ⊂ C. A conjunctive clause C is called positive (negative, resp.) if and only if C POS (C NEG, resp.). In this paper we adhere to the skeptical view of explanations, rendered in the following definition: This property justifies to represent all factual explanations of some abductive setting compactly just by the set of minimal factual explanations, that is, those factual explanations that do not properly extend some other explanation:
Definition 6 (Minimal Factual Explanation). Let A be an abductive setting. A minimal factual explanation for A is a factual explanation C for A such that there does not exist another factual explanation D for A with D ⊂ C.
A further notion of "minimality" for factual explanations is obtained by considering just complete explanations, explanations that contain for each atom A 0 occurring in of the explanation scope either A 0 or ¬A 0 , and compare them with respect to their positive member literals: C ≤ D iff project POS (D) |= project POS (C). We call factual explanations that are minimal in this sense smallest. There is a one-one correspondence of the smallest explanations to a certain subset of the minimal explanations (Prop. C27). Smallest explanations can be combined with the background by adding their positive literals as facts, which yields a normal logic program, and removing from the open scope all members whose atom occurs in the explanation scope, independently of the particular explanation (see Sect. C and D).
In the literature, it is often required that the combination of explanation and background is consistent. For reasons explicated in Sect. Bthis is specified here as a separate property: Integrity constraints, that is, rules with empty head, are in the literature on abduction in logic programming often assigned a special role. We consider here just normal logic programs, which, however, allow to encode constraints with respect to the consistency view [19] by rules with a head atom that indicates failure and is added negated to the observation [8, Sect. 3].
The Globally Weakest Sufficient Condition
The globally weakest sufficient condition (GWSC) [37] is the application pattern of second-order quantification by which explanations with respect to classical logic are characterized as in (i) in the introduction. We specify it formally in terms of literal projection, such that also polarity can be constrained:
The following alternate characterization provides intuition on the relationship to abductive explanations: The GWSC of G on S within F is the weakest formula H S such that F ∧ H |= G. More precisely:
Proposition 9 (Alternate Characterization of the GWSC). For all formulas F, G, H and scopes S it holds that H ≡ gwsc S (F, G) if and only if: (1.) H S, (2.) H |= G, and (3.) for all formulas H S such that F ∧ H |= G it holds that H |= H.
The following property implies that a GWSC on scope S can be expressed as a propositional formula in negation normal form that only involves literals from S:
Proposition 10 (Scope Closedness of the GWSC). For all formulas F, G and scopes S it holds that gwsc S (F, G) S.
The GWSC is closely related to weakest sufficient conditions (WSCs), devised in [24] for propositional logic and adapted to first-order logic in [5] . Aside of the consideration of polarity, GWSCs differ from WSCs in the sense of [24] in that for a given formula and scope only GWSCs are unique up to equivalence [37] .
Abduction with Logic Programming Semantics
The GWSC basically relates to classical semantics. How can it be applied with non-classical logic programming semantics? Lemma 11 below, about "extension transparency", provides the required link. It states requirements that allow a formula to be moved between the context of the non-classical semantics in the argument of the sem operator -where the formula "extends" a logic programand a classical context outside the sem operator. Based on this lemma, we then develop characterizations of abductive explanations in terms of the GWSC for the considered logic programming semantics.
The involved lemma, theorem and propositions will be expressed in a generic way, where the differences relating to the particular semantics are factorized out into three auxiliary concepts that expand differently, depending on the semantics indicated by their first argument. The first of these concepts, CF, represents the circumscribed formulas in the definitions of stable and pstable. It is thus defined for formulas F as CF(stable, F ) 
Lemma 11 (Extension Transparency
We apply this lemma mostly to formulas G satisfying the stronger condition G 0 ∩ O, which means that G can be expressed in terms of open atoms from group 0. The weaker precondition in the lemma results in the course of the proof (Sec. A). It will be used in Sect. 8 to justify a way in which stable model computation invoked on the background combined with the negated observation can be applied to compute explanations. Based on Lemma 11, Theorem 12 below can be proven. It shows for the stable model and the partial stable model semantics that factual explanations are -modulo conversion by IC -exactly the conjunctive clauses in the explanation scope that imply the GWSC of the program representation wrapped in the semantics operator and of the observation. For the well-founded semantics, the equivalence to the partial stable model semantics with respect to explanations for "defined" observations is stated, which follows from Prop. 2.
Theorem 12 (Factual Explanation in Terms of GWSC).
Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting. Let C 0 be a conjunctive clause. If sem ∈ {stable, pstable}, then the following two statements are equivalent: 1. C is a factual explanation for A. 2. C S and IC(sem, C) |= gwsc S∩IG(sem) (sem O (F ), G). If sem = wf and G imin-scope, then (1.) is equivalent to: 3. C is a factual explanation for pstable, O, S, F, G .
Since gwsc S (pstable(F ), G) ≡ gwsc S (pstable(F ), cons ∧ G), in abductive settings with pstable the observation G can be equivalently replaced by any formula G such that (cons ∧ G ) ≡ (cons ∧ G). In particular, an observation (p 0 ∧ p 1 ), which expresses that p is T, can be replaced by just p 0 , and (¬p 0 ∧ ¬p 1 ), which expresses that p is F, by just ¬p 1 . The following example illustrates a case where the factual explanations with stable differ from those with pstable and wf.
Example 13 (Abduction with Different Semantics I). Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting, where
, and G = p 0 . If sem = stable, there is a single minimal factual explanation for A, namely a 0 . If sem ∈ {pstable, wf}, there are two: First,
. To see that a 0 is then not an explanation, consider that pstable {a,b} (F ∧ a 0 ) ≡ {a}, {} ∨ {a, b, p}, {} ∨ {a, p}, {b} .
The following comprehensive example demonstrates further differences of the three considered logic programming semantics with respect to abduction, in particular a case where a meaningful explanation for a fact being observed as undefined is only obtained with the partial stable model semantics.
Example 14 (Abduction with Different Semantics II). Assume a domain with two persons a, b, one of them, b, being "the barber". For x, y ∈ {a, b} let sxy stand for "x shaves y", let mx , fx stand for "x is male" and "x is female", respectively. In addition let ss stand for "barbers are self-shavers". The following program F expresses: "a person that is male and does not shave himself is shaved by b", "if barbers are self-shavers, then b shaves himself", and "all persons are either female or male":
. Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting, where O = S = {ma, mb, ss}. Let us first consider the partial stable model semantics, i.e., assume sem = pstable. A distinguishing feature of this semantics is that it allows to compute explanations for the undefinedness of observations: Let G = (¬sbb 0 ∧sbb 1 ). Then G imin-scope and G expresses that "sbb is U". As the single minimal factual explanation for A we then obtain (mb 0 ∧ ¬ss 0 ). Since the well-founded model is a partial stable model, this is also an explanation w.r.t. the well-founded semantics. However, there are explanations w.r.t. the well-founded semantics that are not explanations w.r.t. the partial stable model semantics. Here for example the "empty" explanation , since the well-founded model of F w.r.t. O is {}, {saa} , where the value of sbb is U. Notice that in the example only the explanation w.r.t. the partial stable model semantics provides the desired information about the reasons for sbb being undefined, i.e., that the barber is male and that "barbers are self-shavers" is false. For "defined" observations G, i.e., if G imin-scope, explanations w.r.t. the partial stable model semantics and the well-founded semantics coincide. In the case G = sbb 0 , expressing that the value of sbb is T, we obtain ss 0 as single minimal factual explanation. In the case G = ¬sbb 1 , expressing that the value of sbb is F, we obtain (¬mb 0 ∧ ¬ss 0 ). Let us now consider the stable model semantics, i.e., assume sem = stable. For the observation G = sbb 0 , the minimal factual explanations then are ss 0 and mb 0 , the first one coinciding with the partial stable model semantics. For the observation G = ¬sbb 0 , the only minimal factual explanation is just ¬ss 0 . The dependency of ¬mb 0 in the explanation obtained for the partial stable model semantics, introduced through the "paradoxical" rule (sbb 0 ← mb 0 ∧ ¬sbb 1 ), is not taken into account by the stable model semantics.
All the three considered logic programming semantics are factual explanation monotonic, which follows from Theorem 12:
Proposition 15 (Factual Explanation Monotonicity of Considered Logic Programming Semantics). An abductive setting A = sem, O, S, F, G where sem ∈ {stable, pstable, wf} is factual explanation monotonic.
Theorem 12 gives a characterization of factual explanations in terms of conjunctive clausal implicants of some particular GWSC. A straightforward consequence is that minimal factual explanations correspond to prime implicants of that GWSC, as stated in the following proposition. Recall that a prime implicant of a formula F is a conjunctive clause C such that C |= F and there does not exist another conjunctive clause D such that D |= F and D ⊂ C.
Proposition 16 (Minimal Factual Explanations and Prime Implicants).
Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting. Let C 0 be a conjunctive clause. Then the following two statements are equivalent for sem ∈ {stable, pstable}: 1. C is a minimal factual explanation for A.
IC(sem, C) is a prime implicant of gwsc S∩IG(sem) (sem O (F ), G).
If sem = wf and G imin-scope, then (1.) is equivalent to: 3. C is a minimal factual explanation for pstable, O, S, F, G .
From Prop. 10 it follows that gwsc S∩IG(sem) (sem O (F ), G) S ∩ IG(sem), and thus, if sem = pstable, then gwsc S∩IG(sem) (sem O (F ), G) is equivalent to a formula in DNF with only consistent disjuncts, where the positive literal formulas are from group 0 and the negative ones from group 1. To convert such a DNF into prime implicants form, i.e., the disjunction of all its prime implicants, it suffices to remove subsumed conjunctive clauses. The following example illustrates the relationship of prime implicants and minimal explanations for the partial stable model semantics.
Example 17 (Prime Implicants Form with Partial Stable Models).
Consider the setting of Examp. 13. Then gwsc S∩IG(pstable) ( 
, where the latter formula is in prime implicants form. To obtain the minimal factual explanations, we remove the two disjuncts (a 0 ∧ ¬a 1 ) and (b 0 ∧ ¬b 1 ), which would become inconsistent after renaming from group 1 to group 0. This requirement of consistency is implicit in Prop. 16 with the precondition that C 0 is a conjunctive clause.
Related Work
As indicated in the introduction in the context of the second-order characterization (i) of classical abductive explanations, similar characterizations have been formulated in a number of works. With respect to non-monotonic semantics, the author is only aware of a second-order characterization for default logic in [32] , where a translation of default abduction problems into QBFs is specified such that the models of the resulting QBF correspond to the explanations. The relationship to second-order quantifier elimination is not made explicit there. In [7] a QBF characterization of the existence of consistent abductive explanations with respect to classical propositional logic is shown. Only positive explanations, that is, sets of atoms, are permitted. To achieve this, literal projection is encoded as Boolean quantification in [7] . Otherwise, the presented schema is essentially (i) conjoined with a condition that ensures background consistency. In [7] also a QBF representation of the stable model semantics is given, but its interplay with abduction is not considered there. In [8] abduction for stable model and well-founded semantics is formalized and complexity results for associated decision problems are given. The role of QBFs there is that hardness results are proven with translations from decision problems for QBFs with certain quantifier prefixes into the abductive decision problems. Negative literals in explanations are not considered in [8] .
Several works on computing credulous abductive explanations with respect to the stable model semantics are based on the approach of [20] . Similarities to the present work include the consideration of open abducibles and the relationship of minimal explanations to prime implicants. Computation of skeptical explanations can be performed with the credulous approach in a trivial way: Computing all stable models of the background and possible explanations, independently of the observation, and inspecting these afterwards. In [17] it is shown how the computation of credulous explanations with respect to the stable model semantics can be expressed as computation of stable models of programs with integrity rules. The knowledge base is a normal logic program. To encode that abducibles are open, for each abducible p rules (p not p ) and (p not p) are added, where p is a fresh symbol. Finally, the observation q is added as an integrity constraint (⊥ not q). There is a one-one correspondence between stable models of the resulting program and explanations of q. As noted in [25] , a major drawback of this method is that it involves the actual computation of all explanations, not taking into account that the minimal ones provide a succinct representation of them. A variant of [17] is described in [16] , where a generalization of the stable model semantics to rules with literals instead of just atoms, as well as disjunctive heads and negation as failure in the head is considered. Computation of explanations is there encoded similarly to [17] , except that the openness of abducibles p is expressed by rules (p | not p ). Minimality with respect to the set of abducibles is taken into account [16, Corollary 3.3] , but in a way that just suggests to compute first the models and only afterwards extract explanations and compare them with respect to minimality. In [25] , the approach of [20] is improved by discerning redundant explanations. Explanations correspond to sets of literals. It is shown that the set of all explanations can be represented by the set of minimal explanations, and that minimal explanations to correspond to prime implicants. Again, only credulous explanations are considered.
A characterization of stable models in terms of circumscription is presented in [10] as a transformation SM(F ) on classical formulas F . In contrast to the stable operator, based on [23] , the predicate occurrences that are affected by circumscription are identified in [10] by their syntactic position within the formula, such that classically equivalent formulas are not necessarily equivalent with respect to the logic programming semantics. Interestingly, an analog to Lemma 11 is shown in [10, Sect. 5.1]: SM(F ∧ G) ≡ SM(F ) ∧ G whenever G has no strictly positive occurrences [read: each occurrence is negative, i.e. is in NEG, or is subjected to negation as failure, i.e., is from group 1] of intensional predicates Abduction with respect the well-founded semantics has been elaborated in [1] for programs with a second type of negation, so-called explicit negation, and integrity constraints. A semantic characterization of explanations is specified, and a computation method is described and proven correct. Explicit negation and "coherency" in [1] at least superficially correspond to predicate group 1 and the cons axiom, although a detailed comparison still needs to be done. Concerning abduction with respect to the partial stable model semantics, the present author is not aware of a thorough previous investigation.
Conclusion
We have seen that abductive explanations with respect to different logic programming semantics can be characterized semantically as formulas with secondorder operators. This provides a solid basis for subtle issues such as abduction with the partial stable model semantics, and, as further described in the appendices, alternate kinds of minimality, the handling of negative facts in explanations, and abductive consequences. A distinguishing feature of such characterizations is that they can be directly processed by elimination of the second-order operators, that is, computing for a given formula with these operators an equivalent formula without them. Approaches to second-order quantifier elimination include, with respect to first-order and modal logics, the resolution-based SCAN [12, 14] and the direct methods [4, 11] . Of course, with respect to full first-order logic, these methods are inherently incomplete. Further relevant techniques stem from knowledge compilation [34] and SAT solving, where Boolean variable elimination is an important preprocessing technique [6, 27] .
From an algorithmic point of view, the elimination approach suggests two possible ways to divide the computation of explanations into subtasks. Consider the computation of all minimal background consistent factual explanations with respect to the stable model semantics. According to Prop. 16, the core expression then is gwsc S∩0 (stable O (F ), G). Explanations can be computed by expanding the gwsc and stable operators, eliminating the resulting secondorder quantifiers, and postprocessing the result by computing prime implicants and removing explanations that are not background consistent. A naive implementation that proceeds in this way and allows small experiments is provided with [36] 3 . The second way to divide the computation begins with computing stable O (F ) with a dedicated system for stable models. Lemma 11 justifies to take positive observations into account at this stage: If G contains only positive atoms from group 0, then
. Combinations of stable model computation with second-order quantifier elimination have been developed [9, 13] , but it needs to be investigated whether they can be used for the computations suggested here.
On the agenda for future work are also further applications of the semantic aspects of the characterizations. For example, relationships to concepts of equivalence of logic programs, in particular abductive equivalence [31] and uniform equivalence. Can complexity results be read-off from the characterizations? Are there useful relationships between abduction with respect to non-monotonic semantics and the many other applications of GWSC and WSCs [24, 5, 37] as well as the further similar concept of perfect rewriting [2] ?
The following appendix sections contain proofs of Lemma 11 and Theorem 12 (Sect. A), and discussions of background consistency (Sect. B), smallest factual explanations (Sect. C), the possibilities to incorporate negative facts in explanations into programs (Sect. D) and abductive consequences (Sect. E).
A Proofs
This appendix section contains proofs of Lemma 11 and Theorem 12. In the proof of Lemma 11 properties of circumscription are applied, for which we need some auxiliary definitions and propositions. We define scope-determined circumscription equivalently to the definition in Sect. 2 but in terms of an auxiliary intermediate operator raise [37] .
Definition A18 (Raising and Scope-Determined Circumscription). For interpretations I, scopes S and formulas F , define:
Proposition A20.ii below provides an alternate characterization of raising that refers to the biscope and uniscope of a scope, two disjoint subsets into which a scope can be partitioned: The biscope contains those members of the scope whose complement is also a member of the scope (thus they are "bi-polar" members). The uniscope contains the remaining members of the scope, that is, those whose complement is not also a member of the scope (thus they are "uni-polar" members). The following definitions provide formal notation for this:
Definition A19 (Biscope and Uniscope Partitions of a Scope). For scopes S define:
Proposition A20 (Properties of Raising). Let S be a scope, let F, G be formulas and let I be an interpretation. It then holds that:
(ii) I |= raise S (F ) if and only if there exists an interpretation J such that I |= F , J ∩ bsc(S) = I ∩ bsc(S), and J ∩ usc(S) ⊂ I ∩ usc(S).
Lemma 11 (Extension Transparency) Let sem ∈ {stable, pstable}, let F be a formula, let O be an atom scope, and let G be a formula such that
Proof. We show the lemma separately for the two cases that sem is stable and pstable. The essential difference of the two proofs is that formulas "extending" the logic program can be moved directly outside the stable operator, while they have to be subjected to a systematic renaming of negative literals to predicate group 1 for the partial stable model semantics. Thus, the proofs differ essentially just in that in the case of pstable these renaming transformations are woven in.
Case sem = stable. Define SC as shorthand for the circumscription scope in the definition of stable, that is, +0 ∪ 1 ∪ (O ∩ 0). We first show that the precondition G (0 ∩ (O ∪ NEG)) ∪ 1 implies the following equivalence:
The left-to-right direction of equivalence (xii) follows from Prop. A20.i. The right-to-left direction is shown in the following table. Assume (1), the precondition of the proposition. Let I be a model of the right side of equivalence (xii), that is, assume (2) and (3). We derive with step (10) that I is also a model of the left side.
by (6)- (8), (3), (1) (10) I |= raise SC (F ∧ G).
by (6)- (9), Prop. A20.ii
Now, the proposition can be shown with the following equivalences, obtained by expanding or contracting operators and applying the equivalence (xii):
Case sem = pstable. Define SCP as shorthand for the circumscription scope in the definition of pstable, that is, ((0 ∪ 1) ∩ POS) ∪ 2 ∪ 3 ∪ O. We first show that the precondition G (0 ∩ (O ∪ NEG)) ∪ 1 implies the following equivalence:
Since clearly CF(pstable, F ∧ G) |= CF(pstable, F ), the left-to-right direction of equivalence (xiii) follows from Prop. A20.i. The right-to-left direction is shown in the following table. Assume (1), the precondition of the proposition. Let G as specified in (2) . Steps (3) and (4) then follow from (2) and (1). Let I be a model of the right side of equivalence (xiii), that is, assume (4) and (5). We derive with step (18) that I is also a model of the left side.
(
by (2), (1) (5) I |= raise SCP (CF(pstable, F ) ). assumption (6) I |= CF(pstable, G). assumption (7) I |= G .
by (6) , (3) (8) There is a J such that (9) J |= CF(pstable, F ), (10)
by (10)- (13), (7), (4) (15) J |= cons.
by (9) (16) J |= CF(pstable, G).
by (15), (14), (3) (17) J |= CF(pstable, F ∧ G).
by (16), (9) (18) I |= raise SCP (CF(pstable, F ∧ G)).
by (17), (10)- (14), Prop. A20.ii
To derive step (14) we applied that for all formulas F , scopes S and interpretations I, J it holds that if F S, I |= F and I ∩ S ⊆ J, then J |= F . Now, the proposition can be shown with the following equivalences, obtained by expanding or contracting operators and, to obtain the equivalence of (23) to (22), by equivalence (xiii).
In the proofs of the cases of Theorems 12 and E29 that apply to the partial stable model semantics we will represent the systematic polarity dependent renaming of predicate groups in conjunctive clauses with a shorthand as follows: Let
be a conjunctive clause, where m, n ≥ 0. We then write C also as C[+0, −0], and write C with the negated atoms replaced by their correspondents from group 1, that is, Proof. We show the proposition separately for the three cases that sem is stable, pstable and wf.
Case sem = stable. For this case we show the theorem generalized to arbitrary explanations instead of just factual explanations. We prove that under the precondition that S ⊆ O, which holds by the definition of abductive setting (Def. 3), the following two statements are equivalent for all formulas H: H is an explanation for A, and (xiv)
This equivalence implies the theorem since for all conjunctive clauses C it holds that IC(stable, C) = C and IG(stable) = 0. Consider the following table. We assume as step (1) the precondition S ⊆ O, ensured by Def. 3. In addition, we assume as step (2) that H S ∩ 0. For the right side of the theorem this condition is explicitly stated, for the left side it follow from the definition of explanation (Def. 4).
Step (3) follows from these assumptions.
by (1), (2) Equivalence of (xiv) and (xv) now follows since under the assumptions just made H is an explanation for A if and only if H |= gwsc S∩0 (stable O (F ), G):
by (2) 
Section B
Consider the following table. We assume as step (1) the precondition S ⊆ O, ensured by Def. 3. In addition, we assume as steps (2) and (3) (4) and (5) follow from these assumptions.
by (3), since IG(pstable) = imin-scope
We conclude the proof for the case of sem = pstable by showing that under the assumptions just made the following equivalences hold:
To derive step (8) we applied that for all formulas F and ungrouped atom scopes O it holds that pstable O (F ) |= cons.
Case sem = wf. This case follows easily from the case sem = pstable, the definition of factual explanation and Prop. 2.
B Background Consistency as a Separate Property
Background consistency is in the literature on abduction often required as an inherent property of explanations. Our specification as a separate property (Def. 7) is motivated by the follwing rationales: In a classical setting, the GWSC is the unique weakest explanation. From that point of view, requiring background consistency from explanations is redundant, since explanations fail to have this property only if no other explanations exist. A second rationale is that in explanation monotonic settings background consistency can be straightforwardly ensured with a "postprocessing" operation applied to the GWSC, as justified by the following proposition:
Proposition B22 (Picking Background Consistent Explanations). Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting. If sem, O, S, F, ⊥ is factual explanation monotonic, then the following statements are equivalent: 1. C is a background consistent factual explanation for A and there does not exist another background consistent factual explanation D for A such that D ⊂ C. (2.) C is a background consistent minimal factual explanation for A.
Proposition B22 can be applied to ensure that the factual explanations which are background consistent and minimal compared to the other background consistent factual explanations -i.e., those explanations which are typically desired as final output of the explanation computation -can be obtained by picking the background consistent explanations from the minimal (but not necessarily background consistent) factual explanations obtained, e.g., as prime implicants from the GWSC according to Prop. 16.
C Smallest Factual Explanations
As already indicated in Sect. 4, aside of the concept of minimal factual explanation (Def. 6), that is, "minimality" with respect to a set of literals, another concept of "minimality" can be associated with factual explanations: "minimality" with respect to the set of positive literals. We call factual explanations that are "minimal" in the latter sense smallest factual explanations. The precise definition is based on the concept of complete conjunctive clause: 
Then there are three minimal factual explanations for A: (a 0 ∧ ¬b 0 ), (a 0 ∧ ¬c 0 ), and (a 0 ∧ d 0 ). There is only a single smallest factual explanation for A:
Clearly, the set of all factual explanations for some abductive setting can be determined from the set of the minimal factual explanations, and vice versa. The smallest factual explanations can be determined from all factual explanations (and thus also from the minimal factual explanations). However, it is not in general possible to determine all factual explanations from the smallest factual explanations. There is a one-one correspondence of the smallest factual explanations to just to a subset of the minimal factual explanations. Proposition C27 below makes this precise. It is preceded by an auxiliary definition, the notation fillneg(A, C) for the conjunctive clause that is complete for A and obtained by extending C with negative literals:
Definition C26 (Fillneg). Let A be an abductive setting with explanation scope S. For conjunctive clauses C S ∩ 0, The following property allows to express the negative literals in explanations in another way, by removing them from the open scope, such that the syntactic constraints of normal logic programs can be preserved:
This property holds for the stable and partial stable model semantics if A does not occur in the head of a rule of the program represented by F , which can be expressed semantically as F ≡ forget {+A 0 } (F ). A disadvantage of applying equivalence (xvi) to represent negative facts by altering the open scope is that the respective open scope then depends on the particular explanation. The following property, which again holds for the stable as well as the partial stable model semantics, justifies that also positive facts can be removed from the open scope: 
E Abductive Consequences
Consider the following example from [26] : Let A = stable, O, S, F, G , where and G = grassIsWet 0 . Then rainedLastNight 0 is the only minimal factual explanation for A. When added to the background, this explanation has aside of the observation also doNotBikeToWork 0 as a consequence. The notion of abductive consequence [26] takes account of such "collateral" consequences of the background when it is combined with explanations of some observation. We consider here a specific variant of this concept: A formula is an factual-skeptical abductive consequence of some observation if and only if for all factual explanations of the observation the formula is a consequence of the background combined with the explanation. More precisely:
Definition E28 (Factual-Skeptical Abductive Consequence). Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting. A formula H is a factual-skeptical abductive consequence of A if and only if for all factual explanations C for A it holds that sem O (F ∧ C) |= H.
The following theorem shows how factual-abductive consequences can be characterized with the GWSC. It follows from Theorem 12, Lemma 11 and for the well-founded semantics from Prop. 2.
Theorem E29 (Abductive Consequences). Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting. If sem ∈ {stable, pstable}, then the following two statements are equivalent: 1. H is a factual-skeptical abductive consequence of A. 2. sem O (F ) ∧ gwsc S∩IG(sem) (sem O (F ), G) |= H. If sem = wf, G imin-scope and H imin-scope, then (1.) is equivalent to: 3. H is a factual-skeptical abductive consequence of pstable, O, S, F, G .
Proof. We show the proposition separately for the three cases that sem is stable, pstable and wf.
Case sem = stable. Recall that IG(stable) = 0, thus statement (2.) of the theorem expands into stable O (F ) ∧ gwsc S∩0 (stable O (F ), G) |= H.
Let W be a shorthand for gwsc S∩0 (stable O (F ), G). Assume the precondition of the theorem:
(1) S ⊆ O by Def. 3 We reformulate the left side of the theorem by expanding definitions and applying Theorem 12 and Lemma 11 and then show the equivalence to the right side:
H is a factual-skeptical abductive consequence of A (3) iff For all factual explanations E for A it holds that stableO(F ∧ E) |= H (4) iff For all conjunctive clauses E S ∩ 0 such that E |= W it holds that stableO(F ∧ E) |= H by (1), Thm. 12 (5) iff For all conjunctive clauses E S ∩ 0 such that E |= W it holds that stableO(F ) ∧ E |= H. by (1), Lem. 11 (6) iff (stableO(F ) ∧ W ) |= H.
Clearly (6) implies (5) . It remains to show that also (5) implies (6) . Assume (5) . Let (W 1 ∨ . . . ∨ W n ) be a formula that is equivalent to W and in disjunctive normal form with conjunctive clauses W 1 , . . . , W n S ∩ 0. The existence of such a formula follows from Prop. 10. Then, by (5), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it follows that (stable O (F ) ∧ W i ) |= H, which implies (6). Case sem = pstable. Let W be a shorthand for gwsc S∩IG(pstable) (pstable O (F ), G). Assume the precondition of the theorem:
We reformulate the left side of the theorem by expanding definitions and applying Theorem 12 and Lemma 11 and then show the equivalence to the right side:
H is a factual-skeptical abductive consequence of A Clearly (6) implies (5) . It remains to show that also (5) implies (6) . Assume (5) . Let are inconsistent conjunctions of literal formulas. The existence of such a DNF follows from Prop. 10 since any projection of a propositional formula is equivalent to a propositional formula in negation normal form whose literals are all in the projection scope. Then, by (5), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} it follows that pstable O (F ) ∧ W i [+0, −1] |= H.
Step (6) The following example shows a case where the abductive explanations and consequences differ, depending on whether the stable model or the partial stable model/well-founded semantics is used.
Example E30 (Abductive Consequences). Let A = sem, O, S, F, G be an abductive setting, where O = S = {a, b}, F = (p 
